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Newell v. State of Nevada, 131 Nev. Adv. Op. 97 (December 24, 2015)1
CRIMINAL LAW: USING FORCE IN RESPONSE TO THE COMMISSION OF A FELONY
Summary
The holding of State v. Weddell is extended. Responding with deadly force to the
commission of a felony per NRS § 200.160 is justified only when the person poses a threat of
serious bodily injury. Short of such a threat, the amount of force used must be reasonable and
necessary under the circumstances.
Background
During an altercation at a gas station in 2012, Patrick Newell sprayed Theodore Bejarano
with gasoline, lit him on fire, and threatened him with a pocketknife. Newell was charged with
attempted murder with the use of a deadly weapon, battery with the use of a deadly weapon,
attempted assault with the use of a deadly weapon 2 , and performance of an act in reckless
disregard of persons or property. At trial, Newell claimed that his actions constituted justifiable
battery because he had reasonably believed that Bejarano was committing felony coercion
against him. However, the district court relied on State v. Weddell in issuing its final jury
instruction. It stated that the amount of force used in a battery had to be reasonable and necessary
under the circumstances and that deadly force could not be used unless the person battered posed
a threat of serious bodily injury. Per the instruction, Newell was convicted of the battery,
attempted assault, and reckless disregard charges. 3 On appeal, Newell argued that the district
court abused its discretion by giving a jury instruction that was an incorrect statement of Nevada
law resulting in a legally impossible conviction.
Discussion
The district court did not abuse its discretion in giving the jury instruction.
Newell argues that the jury instruction is an abuse of discretion because the plain
language of NRS § 200.160 does not require that the amount of force used in battery be
reasonable and necessary or that there exist a threat of serious bodily injury to justify deadly
force. 4 The district court has broad discretion to finalize jury instructions. 5 Whether those
instructions are accurate statements of the law is reviewed de novo, and when the words of a
statute are clear and unambiguous, the court will give them “their plain, ordinary meaning.” 6 The
court may look to other sources in interpreting statutes, however, if a plain meaning
interpretation would lead to an absurd or unreasonable result.7
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The plain meaning of the justifiable battery statutes do not require that the amount of force used
be reasonable and necessary or in response to a serious bodily injury.
Per NRS § 200.275, battery is justified whenever homicide is justified.8 NRS § 200.160
requires that, for a homicide to be justified, it must be either a response to a reasonable
apprehension of an attempted felony or in actual resistance to an attempted felony, without
reference to any particular type of felony.9 Thus, a plain meaning interpretation of both statutes
would conclude that any battery is justified when someone reasonably apprehends or actually
resists an attempted felony of any type. This interpretation is absurd and dictates an examination
of additional sources.
State v. Weddell
The Weddell court held that there was no longer a compelling policy rationale for
allowing private parties to use deadly force to apprehend felons because felonies as a class were
no longer strictly limited to those offenses that would be punished with death upon conviction.10
Instead, private parties apprehending felons could use force only to the degree that was
reasonable and necessary under the circumstances and deadly force required a threat of serious
bodily injury.11
Weddell’s reasoning is applicable to our interpretation of the justifiable homicide statutes.
Since the instant case also concerns the use of deadly force against felons or those
committing felonies without recognizing differences between violent and nonviolent felonies, the
court accepts the Weddell rationale when using force in response to the commission of a felony.
When reasonably apprehending an attempted felony or actually resisting an attempted felony, the
degree of force used must be reasonable and necessary under the circumstances, and deadly force
requires a threat of serious bodily injury.
Attempted assault under NRS § 200.471(1)(a)(2) is not legally impossible.
Newell was convicted of attempted assault under NRS § 200.471(1)(a)(2), which is
defined as the “intentional placement of another person in reasonable apprehension of immediate
bodily harm.” 12 Although the court agrees that the attempt to attempt a crime is legally
impossible, this statutory provision is not a crime of attempt and is therefore possible.
Conclusion
The district court was correct to base its justifiable battery instruction on the court’s
holding in Weddell and thus did not abuse its discretion. Furthermore, attempted assault under
NRS § 200.471(1)(a)(2) is legally possible. Judgment affirmed.
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